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Nicht-Technische Zusammenfassung 
Obwohl die EU durch die Harmonisierung von Bankenregulierungen bereits einige 
Hindernisse für grenzüberschreitende Bankgeschäfte beseitigt hat, sind 
grenzüberschreitenden Übernahmen und Fusionen (M&A) im Bankensektor 
weiterhin  seltener als in anderen Sektoren. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht, ob 
und inwieweit die Prüfung von M&A im Bankensektor durch die Aufsichtsbehörde 
eine Barriere für die grenzüberschreitende Konsolidierung im EU Bankensektor 
darstellen könnte. 
Dass die Prüfung durch Bankaufsichtsbehörden ein mögliches Hindernis für 
grenzüberschreitende M&A in der EU darstellt, wurde bereits in Italien deutlich. 
Dort hat die italienische Notenbank im Jahre 2005 die Übernahme von zwei 
italienischen Banken durch eine niederländische und eine spanische Bank blockiert. 
Die EU Kommission hat daraufhin ein Verfahren gegen Italien wegen Verletzung 
der Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit eingeleitet. Um die Transparenz und die rechtliche 
Sicherheit des Prüfungsprozesses zu erhöhen, hat die Kommission mittlerweile 
Änderungen an der EU Bankenrichtlinie vorgeschlagen. 
Obwohl es anekdotische Hinweise gibt, dass der Prüfungsprozess durch die 
Aufsichtsbehörde ein Hindernis für grenzüberschreitende M&A darstellen könnte, 
gibt es bisher noch keine empirischen Anhaltspunkte hierfür. Diese Studie soll diese 
Lücke schließen. Dabei greift sie auf einen Datensatz über die Transparenz der 
Fusionskontrolle im Bankensektor zurück, der von Koehler (2007) aufgebaut wurde. 
Um herauszufinden, ob die Fusionskontrolle ein Hindernis für die 
grenzüberschreitende Konsolidierung im EU Bankensektor darstellt, schätzen wir 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass eine Bank übernommen wird in Abhängigkeit von der 
Transparenz der Fusionskontrolle im Bankensektor. 
Die Resultate der empirischen Analyse deuten darauf hin, dass die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, von ausländischen Banken übernommen zu werden von der 
Transparenz des aufsichtsrechtlichen Prüfungsprozesses abhängt. Die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von einer ausländischen Bank übernommen zu werden, ist 
besonders gering für große Banken. Ein Grund hierfür könnte sein, dass Politiker 
wollen, dass die größten Banken in ihrem Land in inländischem Eigentum sind. Das 
bedeutet, dass die Intransparenz der Fusionskontrolle nicht allein in Italien ein 
Hindernis für grenzüberschreitende Fusionen ist, sondern dass der 
aufsichtsrechtliche Prüfungsprozess eine systematische Barriere für die Integration 
des europäischen Bankenmarktes ist. Aus diesem Grunde bewerten wir die 
Anstrengungen der EU Kommission die Transparenz der Fusionskontrolle im 
Bankensektor zu erhöhen als einen wichtigen Schritt zum Abbau von 
Markteintrittsbarrieren und zur Erhöhung des Integrationsgrades der Bankenmärkte 
in der EU. 
 Non-Technical Summary 
Although the EU has already removed barriers to multinational banking through the 
harmonization of banking regulations, the number of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) is still less frequent compared to domestic M&A and to cross-
border M&A in other sectors (European Commission, 2005). This paper examines 
whether and to which extent the merger approval process of national supervisory 
authorities constitutes a barrier to cross-border consolidation in the EU banking 
sector. 
That M&A control by supervisory authorities has the potential to significantly 
restrict cross-border consolidation in the EU has been demonstrated in Italy where 
the Bank of Italy blocked the acquisition of two Italian credit institutions by a Dutch 
and a Spanish bank in 2005. Subsequently, the EU Commission brought actions 
against Italy for infringement of the principle of the free movement of capital. To 
improve the legal certainty, clarity and transparency of the supervisory review 
process, the EU Commission has meanwhile proposed changes of the relevant article 
of the banking directive that regulates the transfer of ownership in the banking 
sector.  
Although there is anecdotal evidence that the prudential control may constitute a 
barrier to cross-border consolidation in the banking sector, empirical evidence is 
missing until now. This paper aims to fill this gap. It relies on a unique database on 
the transparency of M&A control in the banking sector that has been set up by 
Koehler (2007). To find out if merger control may constitute a barrier to banking 
market integration, we estimate the prospect that a bank is taken over will estimate 
the prospect that a bank is taken over as a function of its characteristics, country 
characteristics and the transparency of merger control in the banking sector. 
The results suggest that the degree of merger control matters for the likelihood that a 
bank is taken over. Particularly large banks are less likely to be acquired by foreign 
credit institutions if merger control lacks transparency. This may be because 
politicians want the largest credit institutions in their country in domestic hands and, 
hence, block cross-border bank mergers. That merger control has the potential to 
significantly restrict cross-border consolidation in the EU has already been 
demonstrated in Italy. Our regression results now indicate that this might not only 
have been the case in Italy, but rather that merger control may constitute a 
systematic barrier to cross-border consolidation in the EU.  
For this reason, we regard the recent effort of the EU Commission to raise the 
transparency of the supervisor review process as an important step to lower market 
entry barriers and to increase the degree of banking market integration in Europe. 
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“Société Générale is a great French bank... and the government intends it to 
remain a great French bank and globalised player.”  
 
(Francois Fillon, French Prime Minister, 
after the French bank Société Générale  
announced trading losses of almost 5 Bill. euros) 
 
1 Introduction 
Although the EU has already removed barriers to cross-border banking through the 
harmonization of banking regulations, the number of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) is still less frequent compared to domestic and to cross-border 
M&A in other sectors (European Commission, 2005). This paper examines whether 
and to which extent the merger approval process of national supervisory authorities 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector. 
That M&A control by supervisory authorities has the potential to significantly 
restrict cross-border consolidation in the EU. That has been demonstrated in Italy in 
2005 as the Bank of Italy blocked the acquisition of two Italian credit institutions by 
a Dutch and a Spanish bank. Subsequently, the EU Commission brought actions 
against Italy for infringement of the principle of the free movement of capital. To 
improve the legal certainty, clarity and transparency of the merger control process, 
the Commission has meanwhile proposed changes of the relevant article of the 
banking directive that regulates the transfer of ownership in the banking sector 
(European Commission, 2006a). Although the examples in Italy have demonstrated 
that the merger control may constitute a barrier to cross-border consolidation in the 
banking sector, systematic empirical evidence on the role of merger control as 
barrier to integration is missing until now. This paper aims to fill this gap. It relies 
on a unique database on the transparency of merger control in the banking sector 
that has been set up by Koehler (2007).  
In the first section, I will review the literature why banks go abroad, why they take 
over or merge with foreign credit institutions and identify the main barriers that may 
prevent banks from expanding abroad. After this brief review, I will estimate the 
probability that a bank is taken over as a function of its characteristics, country 
characteristics and the transparency of merger control in the banking sector. In 
contrast to the existing literature, this paper thereby explicitly distinguishes between 
domestic and cross-border M&A. I find that the probability of being a target of an 
acquisition depends not only on bank- and location specific determinants, but also 
on the transparency of the regulatory process. The results indicate that a bank is 
systematically more likely to be taken over by foreign credit institutions if the 
 2
process of merger approval is transparent. Particularly large banks are less likely to 
be taken over by foreign credit institutions if merger control lacks transparency. This 
supports the hypothesis that governments may block cross-border because they want 
the largest institution in the country to be domestically owned. Domestic M&A are 
not affected. This suggests that merger control constitutes an important barrier to 
cross-border consolidation and that further integration of EU banking markets 
requires a higher degree of transparency of the regulatory process. 
2 Literature Review 
European banking markets are still not integrated according to cross-border M&A 
activity (Cabral et al., 2002). The theoretical and empirical literature offers different 
explanations for this stylized fact.  
Berger et al. (2001) argue that efficiency barriers limit the amount of international 
consolidation of financial institutions within Europe and inhibit the creation of a 
single market.2 Differences in the regulation and supervision of banks are one 
example for these kinds of barriers. Since foreign banks have to comply with both 
regulations at home and abroad, domestic credit institutions have cost advantages 
because complying with two different sets of regulations imposes additional costs on 
foreign banks. Different regulations furthermore reduce the amount of overlapping 
fixed costs. This decreases the potential for banks to reap benefits from economies 
of scale and scope.  
Efficiency barriers furthermore lower the potential to increase efficiency through 
better management practices and organization (Berger et al., 2001). X-efficiency 
gains may arise if the acquiring institution is more efficient ex-ante and brings the 
efficiency of the target bank up to its own level. The expectation is that the more 
efficient banks will restructure and transfer their managerial expertise, policies and 
procedures on the target in order to increase efficiency. Since the restructuring and 
reorganization of the acquired institution is more difficult if languages and cultures 
are different, the potential to raise X-efficiency appears to be lower for cross-border 
than for domestic M&A. This may reduce the incentive to take over or merge with 
credit institutions in other countries. Consolidation across borders is therefore likely 
to be limited as long as efficiency barriers exist that prevent that foreign bank can 
take the full advantage of potential efficiency gains from this consolidation (Berger 
et al., 2001).  
The empirical literature on the efficiency effects of bank M&A suggests that 
efficiency barriers may indeed exist. Vander Vennet (1998), for example, finds that 
                                           
2  The same argument has been put forward by Buch and DeLong (2004). They argue that 
information costs and banking regulations inhibit cross-border consolidation. 
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in Europe some mergers tended to improve, whereas other types tended to decrease 
cost efficiency.3 Studies that compare the efficiency of foreign-owned and domestic 
banks do not find much evidence for efficiency gains through cross-border 
consolidation either. Vander Vennet (1996) among others finds in a related study 
that foreign-owned banks in Europe had about the same cost efficiency as domestic 
banks. In contrast, Bonin et al. (2005) find that foreign banks are more cost efficient 
than domestic banks in ten Central and Eastern European countries. Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu (1998) for Croatia and Matousek and Taci (2002) for the Czech Republic, 
in contrast, find no evidence of greater efficiency of foreign banks. These results 
suggest that in some countries substantial efficiency barriers exist that offset most of 
any potential efficiency gains from cross-border M&A. Since only the most efficient 
banks are able to overcome these barriers, efficiency barriers may constitute an 
important obstacle to banking market integration in Europe.  
Besides efficiency barriers there may also be market entry barriers that limit cross-
border consolidation. While efficiency barriers lower the potential for efficiency 
improvements and hence the incentive to move abroad, market entry barriers prevent 
that a bank which has the incentive is able to do so. Entry barriers may arise, for 
example, from political interference. Boot (1999) argues that governments may 
block cross-border or permit domestic M&A because they want the largest 
institution in the country to be domestically owned. Both efficiency and market 
entry barriers therefore have the potential to significantly restrict cross-border 
consolidation in the EU banking sector. Besides these barriers the decision to take 
over or merger depends on various other bank- and location-specific determinants. 
Foccarelli and Pozzolo (2001) analyze which bank- and location-specific 
determinants matter most for cross-border M&A. Based on a data set of about 2500 
banks from 29 OECD countries for the period between 1994 and 1997 they estimate 
the prospect that a bank expands abroad and takes over other credit institutions. 
They find that banks are more likely to acquire foreign credit institutions if they are 
large and efficient. Banks which are located in countries that do not restrict outward 
foreign direct investment are more likely to be involved in cross-border mergers as 
well.  
Our study is related to the study by Foccarelli and Pozzolo (2001) in that it analyzes 
the determinants of international bank M&A. The focus of our study is, however, 
not on the acquiring banks, but rather on the banks that are taken over and on the 
countries where these banks are located. We therefore do not analyze the push 
                                           
3  Studies on US bank mergers also find only little or no cost X-efficiency improvements through 
mergers on average (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades, 1998; Cummins et al., 1999 and 
Fried et al., 1999; De Young, 1999; Perstiani, 1997 and Berger, 1998). The evidence on cost X-
efficiency in Europe is mixed as well. Vander Vennet (1996, 1998) finds that some group of 
M&As, particularly cross-border M&A, tended to improve cost efficiency, whereas other types 
tend to decrease cost efficiency. 
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factors of cross-border consolidation, but rather concentrate on the pull factors that 
attract multinational banks. These factors may be bank- or location-specific. Bank-
specific factors may be the level of efficiency and the market share of the target 
institution. Since one strategy to reap benefits from consolidation is to increase X-
efficiency through superior management and organization, we expect that foreign 
banks mostly target credit institutions that offer the largest potential for X-efficiency 
gains. These are usually the most inefficient banks in the host country. Banks that 
seek for market power are conversely expected to mainly acquire or merge with 
banks that have a large market share. Bank-specific factors therefore determine 
which banks are taken over. They, however, do not determine in which countries 
foreign banks invest. This depends among others on the level of market entry 
barriers and the degree of political interference in the host country.  
Since direct market entry barriers like restrictions on foreign ownership limit the 
free flow of capital, they are prohibited in the EU. Politicians, hence, have to look 
for other ways to block cross-border acquisitions. In this paper, we argue that 
politicians may use merger control to block cross-border M&A for other than 
prudential reasons. Since politicians have more scope to block cross-border deals if 
merger control lacks procedural transparency, we expect that banks in countries 
where merge control is not transparent are less likely to be taken over by foreign 
credit institutions than banks which are located in countries where merger control is 
transparent.  
3 Empirical Model 
Since the scope for political interference is assumed to be larger when merger 
control lacks procedural transparency, a low degree of transparency of merger 
control is, on the one hand, expected to reduce the probability that a bank becomes 
target of a cross-border acquisition. It may, on the other hand, increase the 
likelihood that it is taken over by a domestic credit institution if politicians promote 
the formation of ‘national champions’. This makes it necessary to estimate the 
probability that a bank is taken over by a domestic and a foreign credit institution 
separately. Hence, we use a multinominal logit framework that allows multiple 
choices.  
There are different methods to estimate models with multiple choices. One method 
is to estimate it as a multinomial probit model. Because of the need to evaluate 
multiple integrals of the normal distribution, the probit model has, however, found 
rather limited use in this setting (Greene, 2003). We therefore choose to estimate a 
multinomial logit model as proposed by McFadden (1973) and already applied by 
Focarelli et al. (2002) to analyze the determinants of bank M&A. This model relies 
on the assumption of independently and identically standard extreme value 
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distributed error terms (Greene, 2003). The probability that a bank in our sample is 
taken over can then be described as follows: 
' '
i 1j i 2 j
i J ' '
i 1j i 2 jj 1
exp(x z )
Pr ob(Y j)
exp(x z )=
β + β= = β + β∑  
where i = 1, 2, 3, …. represents the individual bank and j = 1, 2, 3 the possible 
outcomes (1 = no acquisition, 2 = domestic acquisition and 3 = cross-border 
acquisition), x = bank-specific and z = location-specific explanatory variables. To 
remove the indeterminacy associated with this model, we follow the convention and 
define Y = 1 (no acquisition) as the base category. This gives the following 
probability for each outcome: 
' '
i 1j i 2 j
i J ' '
i 1j i 2 jj 1
exp(x z )
Pr ob(Y j) ,
1 exp(x z )=
β + β= = + β + β∑  
and for the reference category: 
i J ' '
i 1j i 2 jj 1
1Pr ob(Y 1)
1 exp(x z )=
= = + β + β∑  
All coefficients are hence estimated relative to this base and express the probability 
that a bank is taken over by domestic or foreign banks relative to the probability that 
the bank is not taken over. This model is estimated by standard maximum-likelihood 
estimation techniques. 
4 Data  
4.1 Bank Sample 
To estimate our model we constructed a data set on bank M&A in which the target 
institution was located in one of the 25 EU member countries between 1997 and 
2006. Information on M&A comes from the Zephyr database. Balance-sheet data 
has been taken from Bankscope. Both databases have been provided by Bureau van 
Dijk. We use consolidated balance sheets whenever possible and concentrated on 
commercial banks only. Because balance-sheet data were not available for every 
target institution some target banks had to be dropped from the sample. The final 
data set includes 366 deals of which 171 were cross-border and 195 domestic. Since 
multinominal logit estimation requires a reference group we constructed a data set 
comprising the 1219 commercial banks in our country sample that have not been 
subject to an acquisition during the observation period. The whole bank sample 
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consists of 1534 credit institutions. This finally gave us 6709 bank-year 
observations.4 To eliminate outliers we have winsorized all observations of the bank-
specific variables which are below the 1% and above the 99%-percentile of the 
respective variable. 
Some descriptive statistics for the bank sample are given in Table 1. The largest 
number of commercial banks comes from France (302), Germany (273) and Italy 
(218), although these countries have experienced considerable domestic 
consolidation in the past years. This is also reflected by our sample, since the 
probability that a bank was taken over by another credit institution from the same 
country during the period under observation is above the average of the EU-25 and 
the EU-15.5 While domestic consolidation dominates in the larger EU member 
states, foreign credit institutions are the main driver of consolidation in the smaller 
EU countries. Cross-border acquisitions are particularly frequent in the NMS-10. In 
this region, almost one third of all banks were acquired by foreign investors between 
1997 and 2006. This is significantly higher than in the EU-15, where only 4.16 
percent of all credit institutions were taken over by foreign investors. Small 
European countries especially from NMS-10, hence, seem to be more integrated, 
whereas larger EU-15 countries are less integrated in terms of merger activity. 
4.2 Control Variables 
4.2.1 Bank-Specific Determinants  
The literature suggests that banks are more likely to be target of an acquisition if 
they are inefficient and large. To control for the motive to increase X-efficiency we 
use the cost-income ratio (CIR) as a measure for cost and the return on assets (ROA) 
as a measure for profit efficiency.  
Since banks may also be taken over to obtain market power, we include the 
proportion of bank assets to total banking sector assets (MSHARE). Total banking 
sector assets have been taken from Bankscope database and include the assets of 
commercial, savings and cooperative banks. To control for the motive to generate 
economies of scale and scope, we include the amount of bank assets (SIZE). Cost 
                                           
4  Since Koehler (2007) has constructed his indices only for 20 EU countries, we had to drop five 
countries from our sample for which we do not have index values. These countries are Belgium, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. We need these indices to find out if the 
degree of transparency of merger control matters for the likelihood of being taken over by 
domestic and foreign credit institutions. 
5  The EU-15 comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 
NMS-10 consists of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Together they are labelled EU-25. 
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economies of scale occur if the average costs of production decreases as the size of 
the institution increases. Revenue scale economies may arise because some 
customers may need or prefer the services of larger institutions (Berger et al., 2000). 
Economies of scope may arise on the cost and revenue side as well. Cost economies 
of scope may originate among others from sharing physical inputs like offices or 
computer hardware (Berger et al., 2000). Revenue scope economies may stem 
among others from the cross-selling of financial products through different 
distribution channels (Berger et al., 2000).  
To control for the business orientation of banks we include the ratio of net-interest to 
total revenue (NIREV). The importance of retail-banking business may be 
particularly relevant for banks that take over other credit institutions in order to get 
access to local retail-banking markets. To find out if banks are more likely to be 
taken over if they are less risky, we include the ratio of total equity to total assets 
(CAP) as measure of the overall risk profile of a bank. 6    
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics on these variables according to whether 
a bank has been taken over or not. Large banks with a large market share are more 
likely to be taken over than banks with smaller banks with a smaller market share. 
This is in line with our hypothesis that banks are taken over to acquire market power 
and to generate economies of scale and scope. Measured by the cost-income ratio 
and the ROA target banks are less efficient than credit institutions that have not been 
taken over. This supports the hypothesis that banks acquire credit institutions to 
increase X-efficiency. Banks that have not been targeted are also usually better 
capitalized and are more liquid than banks that have been acquired. The importance 
of retail-banking business is reflected by the higher proportion of net-interest to total 
revenue which is higher for targets than for banks which have not been taken over. 
Particularly, cross-border targets have a much higher value for NIREV than banks 
that have not been taken over. This is in line with our hypothesis that banks are 
taken over to get access to local retail-banking markets.  
4.2.2  Location-Specific Determinants  
Since it not only matters which banks are taken over, but also where these banks are 
located we have to include location-specific variables in our regression as well. The 
first variable we include is population (POP). It measures the market potential in the 
host country. We also include the GDP per-capita (GDPPC) to measure the level of 
economic development. Both variables have found to be relevant for multinational 
banking. Goldberg and Saunders (1981), Grosse and Goldberg (1991), Ter Wengel 
(1995), Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) and Buch (2000), for example, find a positive 
                                           
6  See Table 2 in the appendix for the complete list of bank-specific determinants we use in our 
regressions. 
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relation between the market potential and the level of income of the host country and 
the degree of foreign bank presence. While POP and the GDPPC seem to be 
particularly relevant variables for banks that follow a customer-seeking strategy, the 
degree of trade integration is expected to be particularly relevant for banks that take 
over or merge with credit institutions to provide services to customers from the 
home country. This follow-your-customer strategy has been confirmed among others 
by Goldberg and Saunders (1981), Hultman and McGee (1989), Grosse and 
Goldberg (1991), Heinkel and Levi (1992), Ter Wengel (1995), Fisher and 
Molyneux (1996), Brealey and Kaplanis (1996), Yamori (1998) and Buch (2000). 
To control for this strategy, we use the ratio of imports to GDP (IMGDP) as 
indicator for the abundance of home country customers in the host country. 
Besides the market potential and the degree of economic integration the structure of 
the financial system in the host country may also matter. Since banks are expected to 
primarily expand into countries where they can make the most profits, the degree of 
competition between banks and the importance of alternative sources of finance 
have, hence, to be taken into account as well. To control for these determinants we 
include the market share of the three largest credit institutions (C3) as indicator for 
the level of competition and the ratio of stock market capitalization relative to GDP 
(STKMCAP) to measure the importance of capital-market finance.  
To find out if merger activity is larger in countries with lower efficiency barriers to 
integration, we include a variable that measures the amount of telephone mainlines 
per 1000 people. This variable is called TELELINE and is a proxy for information 
costs.7 Market entry barriers also affect the decision if a bank is taken over or not. 
Nigh et al. (1985), Goldberg and Johnson (1990), Sagari (1992), Ter Wengel (1996), 
Miller and Parkhe (1998), for instance, find that foreign bank activity is significantly 
lower in countries that restrict the entry of banks from other countries.  
4.2.3 Transparency of Merger Control 
Since direct market entry barriers, like ownership limits, are in violation of EU 
directives, this paper focuses on indirect entry barriers like merger control. Hence, 
we include variables that measure the scope for political interference. Koehler 
(2007) measures the scope for political interference with two indices he calls 
Approval Authority Index (hereafter: Approval Index) and Appointment Authority 
Index (hereafter: Appointment Index), which are based on a survey conducted 
among EU-25 supervisors.8 The Approval Index measures which authority approves 
                                           
7  Portes and Rey (2005) use a similar variable than TELELINE. They measure information costs 
by the amount of telephone traffic in minutes from the host to the home country. Since we 
concentrate on the target country only, we cannot use such a variable. 
8  More information on index construction and the results for individual countries and regions are 
available in Koehler (2007). The countries for which he has constructed indices are Austria, 
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acquisitions in the banking sector, while the Appointment Index measures by which 
authority the head of the supervisory authority is appointed. The M&A Criteria 
Index measures which general criteria (competition and prudence) are used by 
supervisors to assess the suitability of potential investors and the M&A Criteria 
Index (hereafter: Transparency Index) if the criteria to assess the soundness and 
prudence of a potential investor are documented in publicly available documents. 
All indices are constructed in a way that a larger index value reflects less scope for 
politicians and supervisors to block cross-border merger for other than prudential 
reasons.  
To get a first impression about the relevance of merger control for EU banking 
market integration, we have calculated rank correlation coefficients between these 
indices and the ratio of banks that have been taken of by domestic and foreign credit 
institutions, respectively, to the total number of banks in our sample. The correlation 
coefficients are presented in Table 4. The correlation analysis suggests that the 
degree of transparency of merger control matters for cross-border consolidation. The 
Transparency Index and the proportion of cross-border targets to the total number of 
banks are highly and significantly correlated. The correlation coefficient with the 
proportion of domestic targets is negative, though insignificant. This indicates that 
cross-border merger activity is particularly high in countries in which supervisors 
use transparent criteria to assess the suitability of the proposed investor and have 
less scope to block cross-border and to promote domestic mergers. Cross-border 
M&A also appear to be significantly more frequent according to the Appointment 
Index in countries in which the head of the supervisory authority is not appointed by 
the government. This reduces the influence politicians have on the supervisor, since 
in all countries mergers are approved by supervisory or other specialized authorities 
and not be the government itself. It also explains why the Approval Index is not 
correlated with the probability of a merger in the EU banking sector. Taken together 
this implies that M&A between banks from the same country are less likely in 
countries where politicians have less influence on the supervisory authority to block 
cross-border M&A.  
Not in line with our expectations is the negative correlation coefficient between the 
proportion of cross-border targets and the M&A Criteria Index. The result may be 
driven by the fact that anti-trust issues are usually taken into account in countries 
which record the largest number of cross-border M&A in our sample and suggests 
                                                                                                                                          
Finland, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, 
and Italy as well as Malta, the Czech and Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, and Poland. The time period for which he has complete information for all countries 
and for all indices is 1996 to 2005. 
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that mergers can also be blocked for anti-trust reasons.9 This is, however, not the 
case if the merger has reached community dimension. Then the EU competition task 
force decides on whether the deals is approved or blocked. Since cross-border M&A 
usually reach community dimension, the decision by the national supervisor to block 
cross-border acquisitions for anti-trust reasons can be overruled by the EU task 
force. The strategy to block cross-border M&A because of anti-trust reasons 
therefore does not seem to be a viable option for supervisors and politicians and may 
explain why the correlation coefficient between the M&A Criteria Index and the 
ratio of domestic and cross-border targets is insignificant. 
5 Main Results 
The correlation analysis suggests that merger control may have played a role as 
barrier to cross-border consolidation in Europe. To examine the link between the 
degree of banking market integration and the transparency of merger control more 
closely, also controlling for other characteristics of banks and countries, we perform 
a multinominal logit regression analysis. The dependent variable is a variable which 
takes a 0 if a bank is not acquired (baseline case), 1 if it is taken over by a domestic 
bank and 2 if it is taken over by a foreign credit institution.  As far as we know, this 
is the first time that the determinants of bank mergers are analyzed according to 
whether banks have been taken over by foreign or domestic investors. 
Since we are only interested in the bank- and location-specific variables at the time 
of the acquisition, we dropped all target bank observations from our sample for the 
years after the deal has been completed. The results of our regressions are presented 
in Table 6. The regression coefficients reported are to be interpreted as affecting the 
odds ratio with respect to the baseline case and not as marginal probability. Cluster 
robust standard errors on bank levels are reported in parenthesis. To assess the 
goodness of fit we use the pseudo R2.  
5.1 Bank- and Location-Specific Determinants 
Although the decision to take over a bank depends on both location- and bank-
specific determinants, we first run a regression for each group of variables 
separately. In a second step, we put bank- and location-specific variables together in 
                                           
9  This has lead to a smaller index value for these countries, since Koehler (2007) argues that 
mergers may be blocked supposedly for competition issues. He refers to an example in Poland 
where a clause in the privatization treaty of bank Pekao that did not allow the acquiring bank 
Unicredit, to open subsidiaries and/or branches, acquiring control of banks active in the country 
and making capital investment in any company active in the Polish banking sector for a ten year 
period (EU Commission, 2006b).  
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a single regression. We finally add the indices by Koehler (2007) to find out if 
merger control constitutes a systematic barrier to EU banking market integration.  
The regression results suggest that the size of the credit institution is an important 
determinant for domestic and cross-border mergers. The coefficient for SIZE is 
positive and highly significant. This indicates that banks are more likely to be taken 
over if they are large and confirms our hypothesis that banks are taken over to reap 
benefits from economies of scale and scope.10 Cross-border mergers are also more 
likely to happen if the target bank is inefficient. This is indicated by the negative and 
significant coefficient for the ROA. The result is in line with our hypothesis that 
banks are taken over to increase X-efficiency, since the potential to improve 
management techniques and organization is usually larger for banks which operate 
inefficiently. Since the ROA is insignificant for domestic targets, efficiency 
enhancement does not seem to be the driving force for domestic M&A.11 We also 
include the ratio of equity to total assets (CAP) as indicator of the overall risk profile 
in our regression. The coefficient of CAP is insignificant for domestic and cross-
border targets. This suggests that mergers occur irrespective of the size of the capital 
buffer and the level of risk of the target bank.12  
To find out if banks with a large market share are more likely to be taken over, we 
use MSHARE. Since MSHARE is correlated with SIZE, the latter has to be dropped 
from the regression. The regression with MSHARE therefore not only controls for 
market power, but also serves as a robustness check for the regression with SIZE. 
MSHARE is positive and highly significant for domestic and cross-border targets. 
This indicates that acquisitions are driven by market power motives as well.13 To 
                                           
10  Lanine and Vander Vennet (2006) get the same result for their study of the microeconomic 
determinants of acquisitions of Eastern European by Western European banks. In contrast to 
our study, they analyze the determinants of cross-border bank mergers only and estimate a 
binominal logit model, while we focus on the determinants of both cross-border and domestic 
M&A and therefore choose to estimate a multinominal logit model.  
11 To check the robustness of our results, we have replaced the return-on assets (ROA) by the cost-
income ration (CIR), the coefficient for CIR is positive and significant in almost every 
regression for domestic and cross-border targets. Because these variables are highly correlated 
they cannot be used together in a single regression. The same results get Lanine and Vander 
Vennet (2006). Correlation coefficients for the bank-specific variables are presented Table 6. 
The results for the regression with CIR are not reported, but are available from the author upon 
request. 
12  Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) find no significant influence of the size of the capital buffer 
on the likelihood that a bank is taken over as well.  
13 The same result get Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007). This confirms their hypothesis that 
banks from Western European countries are more likely to take over banks from Central and 
Eastern Europe if they have a large market share in loan and deposit market. They interpret this 
as evidence for the desire of foreign credit institutions to exploit possible market power in loan 
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control for the business orientation, we use the ratio of net-interest to total revenue 
(NIREV). NIREV is insignificant for domestic and significant for cross-border 
targets. The positive coefficient for cross-border targets is in line with our 
hypothesis that banks are taken over by foreign investors to get access to local retail-
banking markets.  
Location-specific determinants also matter for bank mergers. This is reflected by the 
regression results in column 2 of Table 6. According to them, GDPPC matters for 
domestic and cross-border deals. It is significant and negatively correlated with the 
probability of being taken over. This seems to be surprising because banks are 
expected to primarily expand into countries with a higher level of income. Because 
of EU of membership per-capita income is, however, expected to converge over 
time. The negative coefficient for GDPPC in the cross-border equation may, for this 
reason, be explained by the fact that countries with a low GDPPC are expected to 
grow faster than countries which already have a high level of income.14 This 
suggests that countries with lower per-capita income may offer a larger market 
potential than high-income countries. Current market size, however, does not seem 
to determine whether a bank is taken over or not. POP is mostly insignificant. This 
may indicate that banks do not expand into countries which have a large market size, 
but which have a large market potential.  
Banks may also be taken over to maintain present customer relationships and to 
serve customers from their home country. The coefficient of IMGDP confirms this 
follow-your-customer strategy. It is positive and highly significant for cross-border 
targets and insignificant for domestic targets. To control for efficiency barriers of 
integration, we include TELELINE. It turns out to be insignificant for domestic 
M&A and cross-border M&A. This indicates that information costs do not limit 
merger activity. Another interesting finding is that the coefficient for C3 is negative 
and significant for domestic, but insignificant for cross-border mergers. This is what 
we have expected. Since mergers among domestic banks may encounter problems 
with the anti-trust authority, they are less likely to take place in countries where 
market concentration is already very high.15  
                                                                                                                                          
and/or deposit pricing. The results for the regression with MSHARE are not reported, but are 
available from the author upon request. 
14 Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) use GDP per-capita growth instead of GDPPC and find a 
negative correlation coefficient between the probability of being taken over and GDP per-capita 
growth. They conjecture that owing to the expectation of general convergence of the region due 
to trade and integration with the EU macroeconomic determinants for bank acquisitions are of 
less importance. 
15 We also used the stock-market capitalization relative to GDP (STKMCAP) as explanatory 
variable. Because of the high correlation with GDP per-capita we had to drop GDPPC from the 
regression. The results indicate that the size of the stock market does not matter for domestic, 
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To find out if the introduction of the Euro had an impact on banking market 
consolidation, we include a dummy in all regressions that is 1 for all member 
countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and 0 for all other countries in 
our sample. The EMU dummy is significant and positive for domestic mergers. The 
positive coefficient may reflect the massive domestic consolidation process that has 
taken place in the larger Western European countries and which might have been 
triggered by the introduction of a common currency. There is, however, no 
consistent evidence that the Euro had a significant impact on cross-border M&A.  
Since the decision to take over a bank depends on both location- and bank-specific 
determinants, we put both groups of variables together in a single model and 
estimated it again. This, at the same, time serves as a robustness check for the 
coefficients in the previous regressions. The results are reported in the third column 
of Table 6. The coefficients and their level of significance remain mostly 
unchanged. Only the fit improved considerably what indicates that the likelihood 
that a bank is taken over depends on both bank- and country-specific factors.  
5.2 The Importance of Merger Control  
To assess the importance of merger control we now include the four indices Koehler 
(2007) constructed and which measure the scope for politicians and supervisors to 
block cross-border mergers in the banking sector. To prevent that the effect of one 
index on the probability that a merger takes place is picked up by another index 
variable we first put all indices together in one regression. The results are presented 
in column 4 of Table 6. All indices are insignificant. Only the Appointment Index in 
the regression for domestic targets and the Merger Criteria Index in the regression 
for cross-border targets appear to be weakly correlated with the likelihood of being 
acquired. Since some of our indices are highly correlated, we ran separate 
regressions for all indices to prevent multicollinearity. The results of these 
regressions are presented in columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Table 6. In these regressions, 
only the M&A Criteria Index and the Transparency Index appear to be positive and 
highly significant for cross-border targets. This indicates that the probability that a 
bank is taken over is higher in countries where merger control is more transparent. 
The insignificant coefficients for domestic targets, in turn, suggest that politicians 
and supervisors have not used their powers to promote domestic M&A.  
                                                                                                                                          
but for cross-border M&A. The negative coefficient for STKMCAP suggest that banks are 
more likely to be taken over if they are located in countries where alternative sources of finance 
are less important and therefore competition between banks and other financial institutions is 
less intensive than in countries with large stock market capitalization. 
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To find out whether particularly large credit institutions are less likely to be taken 
over, we interacted SIZE with the M&A Criteria and the Transparency Index.16 The 
interaction terms are insignificant for domestic, but significant for cross-border 
targets. The positive sign indicates that particularly larger banks are less likely to be 
acquired by foreign credit institutions if the degree of transparency of merger control 
is low. One reason might be as argued by Boot (1999) that politicians want the 
largest institutions in their country to be domestically owned.  
5.3 Robustness Tests  
One problem might be that our data set includes also those transaction that aim at 
increasing a majority shareholding. Supervisors may not block such acquisitions, 
because domestic banks are already under foreign control. They may also not 
interfere if government bodies sell state-owned banks to foreign investors as, for 
example, repeatedly happened by the way of privatization in Central and Eastern 
Europe. To control for this, we have created a dummy variable for every transaction 
that has increased a majority shareholding. We also constructed a dummy variable to 
identify if banks have been sold by government institutions. The inclusion of both 
variables has not changed our regression results.17  The results also appear to be 
robust to the inclusion country and time dummies.  
A potential problem of our regression analysis might be that the index only varies 
for the NMS-10. To check if this has caused the significance of our index, we 
include a dummy variable for this country group. The dummy appears to be 
insignificant. The Transparency Index kept its positive sign and its level of 
significance. A second and stronger robustness check is to run a separate regression 
for the NMS-10 only. If the degree of transparency of merger control matters for 
cross-border mergers the index should be significant even within this cluster of 
countries. This is the case. The index kept its positive sign and is still significant. 
This suggests that our results are not driven by regional differences between the EU-
15 and the NMS-10, but rather by country-by-country differences in the degree of 
transparency of merger control.  
To find out if the scope for political interference is captured by other variables than 
our index, we put the Rule of Law Index (RLAW) from the World Bank Governance 
Database together with our indices into a single regression (Kaufmann et al., 2006). 
Since the index measures the quality of the contract enforcement and the 
                                           
16 To the group of small banks belongs every banks whose assets are below the 25%-percentile. 
The group of large banks consists of all credit institutions whose assets are above the 75%-
percentile. 
17 The regression results of our robustness checks and model extensions have not been reported, 
but are available from the author upon request. 
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independence of the judiciary from politicians, it may also capture what our indices 
measure. The coefficient for RLAW is insignificant, the Transparency Index, 
however, remains significant. This indicates that the scope for interference through 
merger control cannot be measured with more general indices on the regulatory 
framework, but rather that special indices are necessary to find out if merger control 
constitutes a barrier to integration. 
6 Conclusions 
The motivation of this paper was to find out what determines the probability that a 
bank is being taken over by another credit institution. The paper has shown that the 
answer to this question is not clear-cut. It rather depends on whether banks are taken 
over by foreign or by domestic investors.  
Particularly large banks are less likely to be taken over by foreign credit institutions 
if merger control lacks transparency. We argue that this is the case because the scope 
for politicians to block cross-border M&A is larger in countries in which merger 
control lacks procedural transparency. That merger control has the potential to 
significantly restrict cross-border consolidation in the EU has already been 
demonstrated in Italy where the Bank of Italy blocked two cross-border acquisitions 
in 2005. Our regression results now indicate that this might not only have been the 
case in Italy, but rather that merger control may constitute a systematic barrier to 
cross-border consolidation in the EU. For this reason, we regard the recent effort of 
the EU Commission to raise the transparency of the supervisor review process as an 
important step to lower market entry barriers and to increase the degree of banking 
market integration in Europe. 
Besides merger control bank-specific determinants also matter. Our regression 
results indicate that domestic mergers mainly aim at economies of scale and scope. 
Cross-border M&A, on the opposite, mainly occur to increase market power and to 
get access to local retail-banking markets. X-efficiency improvements through better 
management techniques and organization also influence the decision to take over or 
merge with a foreign credit institution. Besides bank-specific determinants it also 
matters which characteristics the country has where the target bank is located. We 
found that M&A are more likely to take place in countries which offer a larger 
market potential. Our regressions provide, furthermore, evidence that banks follow 
their customers and expand into countries where a large number of customers from 
the home country is already present. The degree of banking market concentration, in 
turn, does not play a role for cross-border, but rather for domestic M&A. This might 
be explained with the fact that domestic mergers may encounter problems with the 
anti-trust authority if the merger has the potential to limit competition.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Bank Sample 
 
Total Number
of Banks
% of which taken
over by domestic 
investors
% of which taken over 
by foreign
investors
Austria 85 2.35 3.53
Belgium 64 12.50 12.50
Cyprus 22 0.00 0.00
Czech Republic 33 15.15 36.36
Denmark 63 7.94 1.59
Estonia 11 0.00 54.55
Finland 10 10.00 0.00
France 302 11.26 4.97
Germany 273 9.89 4.03
Greece 27 14.81 7.41
Hungary 33 15.15 36.36
Ireland 45 2.22 2.22
Italy 218 23.85 3.21
Latvia 28 3.57 46.43
Lithuania 13 15.38 46.15
Luxembourg 139 7.91 6.47
Malta 14 0.00 7.14
Netherlands 64 0.00 6.25
Poland 62 17.74 22.58
Portugal 32 21.88 3.13
Slovakia 22 9.09 27.27
Slovenia 28 10.71 10.71
Spain 113 10.62 7.96
Sweden 27 7.41 0.00
UK 204 2.45 1.47
Mean 77.28 9.95 7.32
     EU-15 111.07 9.62 4.16
     NMS-10 24.18 10.90 27.44
Source: Zepyhr, Bankscope (2007) and own calculations. The number of M&A has been taken 
from Zephyr and the total number of banks from Bankscope. The table reports the total number of 
commercial banks in the sample as well as the percentage share of commercial banks that were 
taken over between 1997 and 2006. % of domestic (cross-border) targets denotes the proportion of 
banks that have been taken over by domestic (foreign) investors. 
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Table 2: List of Bank-Specific Variables 
Name Definition Calculation 
   
Bank Size and Market Share   
   
Size Size Log (Total Bank Assets) 
   
MSHARE market share 
Total Bank Assets/Total Banking 
Sector Assets 
   
Bank Efficiency   
   
ROA return-on-assets before taxes Pre-Tax Profits/Total Assets 
   
CIR cost-income-ratio Total Expenses/Total Income 
   
Capital Adequacy and Overall 
Risk   
   
CAP capital adequacy ratio Total Equity/Total Assets 
   
Business Orientation   
   
NIREV net-interest revenue 
Net-Interest Income/Total 
Income 
Source: Bankscope (2007) 
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Table 3: Bank Characteristics 
 Mean Median Std. Dev.
Summary Statistics for EU-25 Domestic and Cross-Border Targets    
Bank Assets (in th USD) 16 900 000 1 287 698 61 200 000
Market Share 5.68 0.97 9.94
Equity to Total Capital 11.18 7.90 12.96
Cost-Income-Ratio 79.16 72.16 33.98
Return-on-Assets 0.46 0.60 2.30
Net Interest Margin 3.21 2.96 2.02
Liquid Assets to Cust & ST Fundings 25.94 18.20 30.58
Customer Deposits to Total Assets 54.55 56.95 33.30
Net Interest Revenue to Total Revenue 34.68 34.14 15.82
 Summary Statistics for EU-25 Domestic Targets      
Bank Assets (in th USD) 18 400 000 1 232 341 64 500 000
Market Share 3.74 0.32 8.29
Equity to Total Capital 12.33 7.74 16.21
Cost-Income-Ratio 84.19 74.44 41.37
Return-on-Assets 0.37 0.42 2.44
Net Interest Margin 3.01 2.59 1.99
Liquid Assets to Cust & ST Fundings 25.45 21.61 22.38
Customer Deposits to Total Assets 51.01 51.87 25.46
Net Interest Revenue to Total Revenue 33.73 33.31 16.28
Summary Statistics for EU-25 Cross-Border Targets    
Bank Assets (in th USD) 15 500 000 1 341 929 58 500 000
Market Share 7.39 2.07 10.95
Equity to Total Capital 10.09 8.06 8.87
Cost-Income-Ratio 74.48 70.30 24.57
Return-on-Assets 0.54 0.78 2.16
Net Interest Margin 3.40 3.33 2.05
Liquid Assets to Cust & ST Fundings 26.39 15.16 36.60
Customer Deposits to Total Assets 57.89 61.30 39.15
Net Interest Revenue to Total Revenue 35.59 35.24 15.41
Summary Statistics for EU-25 Banks that have not been taken over    
Bank Assets (in th USD) 8 773 429 700 210 41 600 000
Market Share 1.82 0.12 5.43
Equity to Total Capital 12.59 7.89 15.09
Cost-Income-Ratio 68.88 64.48 35.93
Return-on-Assets 0.70 0.57 1.90
Net Interest Margin 2.73 2.21 2.39
Liquid Assets to Cust & ST Fundings 37.81 24.57 41.93
Customer Deposits to Total Assets 60.72 51.94 100.97
Net Interest Revenue to Total Revenue 30.38 29.03 19.09
Source: Zephyr and Bankscope (2007). The targets have been identified by Zephyr and their characteristics 
have been collected from Bankscope for the period between 1997 and 2006. Summary statistics for targets 
refer to the year in which the deal has been completed. The statistics for the credit institutions that were not 
taken have been calculated for the whole period. To eliminate the influence of outliers we have winsorized 
all observations below the 1%-percentile and above the 99%-percentile. 
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Table 4: Correlation Coefficients between Merger Control Indices 
 
Approval 
Authority 
Index 
Appointment 
Authority 
Index 
M&A 
Criteria 
Index 
Transparency
of M&A 
Criteria 
Index 
Approval Authority Index 1.00    
Appointment Authority Index 0.19 1.00   
M&A Criteria Index -0.03 -0.21 1.00  
Transparency of M&A 
Criteria Index 
0.24 0.84* -0.24 1.00 
% of domestic targets 0.05 -0.31 0.11 -0.10 
% of cross-border targets 0.05 0.63* -0.26 0.64* 
Source: Zephyr, Bankscope, Koehler (2007) and own calculations. * indicates significance at the 
5%-level. 
 
Table 5: Correlation Coefficients between Bank-Specific Variables 
  SIZE MSHARE ROA CIR CAP NIREV 
SIZE 1.00      
MSHARE 0.39* 1.00     
ROA -0.00 0.03* 1.00    
CIR -0.18 -0.05* -0.55* 1.00   
CAP 0.48* -0.11* 0.14* 0.07* 1.00  
NIREV -0.21* -0.00 0.05* -0.02* 0.25* 1.00 
Source: Bankscope and own calculations. * indicates significance at the 5%-level. 
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Table 6: Regression Results 
 1 2 3 
 dom cb dom cb dom cb 
        
SIZE 0.206*** 0.281***   0.272*** 0.487*** 
  (0.053) (0.063)   (0.058) (0.076) 
        
ROA -0.580 -0.064   -0.056 -0.115** 
  (0.0828) (0.081)   (0.076) (0.058) 
        
NIREV 0.010* 0.036***   0.006 0.030*** 
  (0.005) (0.006)   (0.006) (0.010) 
        
CAP 0.009** 0.008   0.012 0.005 
  (0.007) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.010) 
        
EMU 0.608** -1.633*** 0.875*** 0.344 1.100*** 0.540 
  (0.252) (0.300) (0.281) (0.295) (0.419) (0.427) 
        
POP   0.125 0.069 -0.021 -0.376** 
    (0.148) (0.166) (0.223) (0.169) 
        
GDPPC   -0.947*** -1.263*** -1.373*** -1.700*** 
    (0.292) (0.328) (0.500) (0.417) 
        
IMGDP   1.334 4.297*** 1.320 4.519*** 
    (1.428) (1.077) (1.828) (1.203) 
        
TELELINE   0.003 0.000 0.003 0.004 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
        
C3   -3.469*** -0.922 -2.980** -0.978 
    (1.034) (0.921) (1.290) (1.012) 
        
Approval Index       
        
Appointment Index       
        
M&A Criteria Index       
        
Transparency Index       
        
Observations 6709 11631 5624 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.07 0.15 
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Table 6 (cont.): Regression Results 
 4 5 6 7 8 
 dom Cb dom cb dom cb dom cb Dom cb 
SIZE 0.265*** 0.500*** 0.272*** 0.488*** 0.264*** 0.492*** 0.273*** 0.497*** 0.273*** 0.503***
  (0.059) (0.736) (0.578) (0.767) (0.591) (0.074) (0.058) (0.074) (0.058) (0.074) 
ROA -0.060 -0.130** -0.056 -0.117** -0.058 -0.113* -0.057 -0.124* -0.056 -0.129 
  (0.076) (0.623) (0.076) (0.059) (0.075) (0.058) (0.771) (0.064) (0.076) (0.060) 
NIREV 0.005 0.026*** 0.006 0.030*** 0.005 0.030*** 0.006 0.027*** 0.006 0.027***
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
CAP 0.011 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.118 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.012 0.007 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.101) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.102) 
EMU 1.047 0.407 1.100*** 0.506 1.102*** 0.508 1.100** 0.504 1.095*** 0.361 
  (0.419) (0.435) (0.420) (0.434) (0.414) (0.435) (0.425) (0.442) (0.414) (0.430) 
POP -0.275 -0.331 -0.019 -0.369** -0.272 -0.274 -0.006 -0.364** -0.005 -0.137 
  (0.278) (0.258) (0.224) (0.172) (0.266) (0.245) (0.238) (0.170) (0.272) (0.190) 
GDPPC 
-
1.574*** -1.898*** -1.377*** -1.668*** -1.562*** -1.650*** -1.410*** -2.010*** -1.353***
-
1.562***
  (0.529) (0.484) (0.506) (0.417) (0.476) (0.452) (0.493) (0.416) (0.517) (0.444) 
IMGDP 0.910 5.772*** 1.321 4.397*** 0.926 4.746*** 1.857 6.248*** 1.310 4.829***
  (2.172) (1.387) (1.831) (1.212) (1.685) (1.143) (2.093) (1.261) (1.835) (1.242) 
TELELINE 0.004 0.006** 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005* 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) -0,003 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
C3 
-
3.790*** -1.224 -2.990** -0.792 -3.619 -0.702 -2.971 -1.218 -2.951 -0.670 
  (1.389) (1.300) (1.336) (1.070) (1.390) (1.238) (1.292) (1.032) (1.331) (1.014) 
Approval 
Index -0.036 0.107 -0.054 0.838       
  (1.100) (1.084) (1.051) (1.128)       
Appointment 
Index -2.044* -0.327   -1.379 0.335     
  (1.113) (0.688)   (0.890) (0.673)     
M&A Criteria 
Index 0.584 1.322*     0.631 1.722***   
  (0.973) (0.721)     (0.804) (0.470)   
Transparency 
Index 0.941 0.772       0.113 1.397***
  (1.042) (0.678)       (0.731) (0.466) 
Observations 5624 5624 5624 5624 5624 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 
Source: Own calculations.  */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 %-level. ‘Dom’ presents 
the results for the regression for domestic and ‘cb’ the results of the regression for cross-border 
targets. Estimates have been calculated by multinominal logit estimation with cluster robust 
standard-errors. The possible outcomes are 0 = no acquisition, 1 = domestic acquisition and 2 = 
cross-border acquisition. 
